

## Message Text

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51

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 NIC-01 ACDA-19

IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 EA-11

SAM-01 SAB-01 CU-04 EB-11 DRC-01 /175 W

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R 011228Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3468

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

USINT DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 2152

CAIRO FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NL

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SUBJECT: FONMIN VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

1. SUMMARY: FONOFF'S POLITICAL DIRECTOR VAN LYNDEN BRIEFED CHARGE ON APRIL 29 ON GIST OF OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS DURING VAN DER STOEL'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION (APRIL 22-28). CSCE GOT THE MAIN ATTENTION WITH NEITHER SIDE BUDGING FROM ITS ESTABLISHED POSITION. OTHER TOPICS INCLUDED MBFR, MIDDLE EAST, AND FUTURE OF KOREA, SOVIET INTERNAL MATTERS AND BILATERAL RELATIONS. VAN LYNDEN CHARACTERIZED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE CONVERSATIONS AS GOOD. HOWEVER, IT IS APPARENT FROM HIS COMMENTS AND OTHER SOURCES THAT IN TERMS OF CONCRETE RESULTS THE VISIT WAS VIRTUALLY A NON-EVENT. END SUMMARY.

2. CSCE: VAN LYNDEN INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A MAJOR TOPIC OF DISCUSSION. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS SHOWED LITTLE GIVE VAN LYNDEN THOUGHT EXCHANGE WAS NOT WITHOUT ITS UTILITY SINCE DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA HAD NOW ENTERED THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS REPROACHED VAN DER STOEL THAT THEY FOUND THE DUTCH POSITION IN GENEVA A LITTLE HARD. VAN DER STOEL REPLIED THAT THE DUTCH POSITION WAS NO DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ITS EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS.

3. ON SPECIFICS OF CSCE: VAN LYNDEN SAID DISCUSSION OF BASKET ONE PRODUCED A CONCEPTUAL CONFLICT. VAN DER STOEL TOLD HIS HOSTS THAT A FRONTIER WAS SOMETHING TO BE CROSSED WITH A MINIMUM OF FORMALITY AND CONTROLS. IN THE DUTCH CONCEPT FRONTIERS WERE OF DECREASING IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE, E.G. THE FRONTIERS WITHIN BENELUX. FOR THE SOVIETS ON THE OTHER HAND, FRONTIERS WERE NOT ONLY INVOLABLE BUT THEY WERE NOT TO BE CROSSED EXCEPT UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS. UNLIKE THE DUTCH THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SYMPATHETIC TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV FOR INSTANCE, REFUSED TO ASSOCIATE THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL CHANGES OF FRONTIER WITH THE NON-USE OF FORCE. VAN DER STOEL INSISTED A GREAT DEAL ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BUT DID NOT ELICIT MUCH SOVIET RESPONSE.

4. THERE WAS NOT MUCH DISCUSSION OF BASKET TWO. THE RUSSIANS  
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SEEMED RATHER PLEASED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR IN GENEVA. AS REGARDS BASKET THREE THE SOVIETS GAVE THE DUTCH THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENTS BUT ONLY IN AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES SUCH AS NON-INTERVENTION. THE TWO SIDES DISAGREED ON THE LEVEL AND TIMING OF THE FOLLOWUP TO THE FIRST CSCE, THE DUTCH HOLDING TO THE LINE THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO RUSH THINGS.

5. MBFR: THE SOVIETS DENIED ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN PROGRESS IN CSCE AND AT THE MBFR TALKS AND INSISTED ON VIEWING THEM AS COMPARTMENTALIZED FORA. THE SOVIETS CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO MBFR. THE BASIC SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT MBFR WAS A VERY DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX MATTER AND THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE JUST AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR DELIBERATIONS.

6. MIDDLE EAST: IN TALKING ABOUT DISENGAGING SYRIAN AND ISRAELI TROOPS THE DUTCH BASED THEMSELVES ON THE COMMON EC DECLARATION OF LAST NOVEMBER 6. THE SOVIETS SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT MODEL IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. THEY MADE IT CLEAR THEY WERE BACKING THE SYRIANS "ONE HUNDRED PERCENT."

7. FAR EAST: THERE WAS NO MENTION OF SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS. THE DUTCH RAISED THE FUTURE OF KOREA IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE NORTH KOREA IF SOME OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE ROK. THE SOVIETS REFUSED THIS GAMBIT.

8. SOVIET INTERNAL MATTERS: THE SOVIETS AGREED WITH A DUTCH PROPOSAL TO FACILITATE FAMILY REUNIONS OF RUSSIANS RESIDENT IN THE NETHERLANDS WITH RELATIVES RESIDENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. REQUESTS FOR SUCH REUNIONS EMANATING FROM RUSSIANS LIVING IN THE NETHERLANDS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES VIA THE EMBASSY. VAN DER STOEL RAISED THE CASE OF SOVIET STUDENT BUKOVSKIY AT A LUNCHEON HE GAVE FOR GROMYKO. ACCORDING TO VAN LYNDEN, GROMYKO REPLIED "I HAVE LISTENED BUT I HAVE NOT HEARD WHAT YOU SAID."

9. BILATERAL RELATIONS: KOSIGYN MADE A FEW SUGGESTIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION, E.G. IN THE

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PETROCHEMICAL FIELD. THE DUTCH WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS DETAILS BUT AGREED THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE EXAMINED AT A JUNE 5 MEETING IN MOSCOW WHERE THE NETHERLANDS INTER-MINISTERIAL DELEGATION WILL BE HEADED BY VERHAGEN, DIRECTOR IN CHARGE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS IN THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. (SEE THE HAGUE'S 2087). VAN LYNDEN DID NOT ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE AGREEMENT TO INCREASE CONSULTATIONS ALTHOUGH HE SAID IT MIGHT LEAD TO A VISIT BY A NETHERLANDS ROVING AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION. VAN LYNDEN CATEGORICALLY EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY PRIMIN DEN UYL. GROMYKO WAITED UNTIL THE LAST DAY TO ACCEPT VAN DER STOEL'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE NETHERLANDS AND GAVE NO INDICATION OF TIMING. LATER A TASS CORRESPONDENT INDICATED TO ONE OF THE DUTCH JOURNALISTS THAT THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN 12 MONTHS.

TANGUY

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